The article describes the facts of anti-state riots in the army during the First Russian Revolution in the south of Ukraine. The author of the article tries to investigate the revolutionary spirit in the Russian army during the revolution of 1905 – 1907. The article highlights the active propaganda activities of revolutionary parties in the army divisions of southern Ukraine. The main attention is paid to the violent nature of confrontation between the power structures of the Russian Empire and the revolutionaries. The article provides instructions for soldiers to suppress the rebel population. The movement and location of military units on the territory of Ukraine is noted in article. The conditions for settling soldiers in new places after moving are described. The conflict of war ministry with other ministries is also described. The conflict arose regarding the involvement of soldiers for various tasks in a revolutionary popular uprising. Attention is paid to the negative attitude of the Russian army soldiers to the Jewish population, as well as the participation of soldiers in Jewish pogroms in southern Ukraine. The article provides examples of insurgent attempts to persuade the military of revolutionary ideals. This context describes the authorities' actions to prevent the convergence of soldiers with people. The author describes an attempt by the revolutionaries to kill a commander of troops by means of a planned attack using explosives. The fact of the uprising of the soldiers of the Kherson Disciplinary Battalion is described. In addition to the active actions of the revolutionaries, the article notes a passive resistance to the authorities, which is manifested in calls not to pay taxes to the treasury. Also, the fact of supporting the army of the part of the population that did not hope for a revolution in the state is described. The article provides statistics on the level of mortality in the military and emphasizes the increase in the number of ineligible persons for military service by healthy in the first half of the nineteenth century. The author notes that at the beginning of the XX century the Russian army was not the defender of the Russian people, but remained the "guardian" of the political monarchical model, its important segment of security.

Keywords: First Russian revolution, South of Ukraine, army, fleet, RSDP.

Introduction. The army of the Russian Empire played a key role in the revolutionary events of 1905 - 1907. On the one hand, the army units were actively involved with the authorities to suppress the riots. On the other hand, the revolutionary forces actively promoted the ideas of freedom and equality, criticized the tsarist officers, concentrated
on the disenfranchisement of a soldier in the Russian army, trying to recruit soldiers to his side. This confrontation was widespread throughout the Russian Empire, the army and the navy. In this context, southern Ukraine was of strategic importance for both camps: counterrevolutionary and revolutionary. The proximity of the border, the multi-ethnicity of the region, the economic and military might of the southern city ports were the reasons and goals of these camps. The fierce revolutionary struggle in the military environment was ideologically based. The question of devotion to the army of the monarchy and empire was most noticeable during the years of particular social tension in 1905 - 1907.

Historiography. Among modern Ukrainian historians who dealt with military issues in the Russian Empire, it should be noted O. Kolevatov (Kolevatov: 2007), who investigated the administrative and economic structure of the Russian army in eastern Ukraine in the nineteenth century. O. Kozynets (Kozynets: 2004) explored training for the Russian army in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The question of the influence of the Orthodox Church on the functioning of the Russian army and navy during the First World War was studied by S. Malyshko (Malyshko: 2011). The influence of national ideas in the military environment in the years of national liberation competitions 1917-1918 researched R. Zinkevich (Zinkevich: 2004).

Topicality the issue. In times of deep political crisis in society, the most pressing question about the functions of the army units and their moral aspect is always emerging, devotion to power or the people? This question is rhetorical to this day. Often, the consequences of the revolution depend on the answer to this question that is the vector of the fluctuation of the political atmosphere. Undoubtedly, the revolutionaries themselves during the revolution of 1905 – 1907 were active representatives of the population, those with whom the army had to fight according to the authorities' instructions. The army itself, too, was formed by the people and was entirely dependent on mobilization mechanisms in society. This connection was, and still is, the dangerous aspect on which the revolutionary forces in 1905 – 1907 tried to ideologically press, promoting the idea of brotherhood between a soldier and a worker, a soldier and a peasant, and so on. It should be noted that such a strategy was often very successful in the Russian Empire and the South of Ukraine, in particular.
The authorities, on the other hand, tried to stabilize the situation in the state and suppress mass riots, relying on other moral aspects - officer's honor and soldiers' devotion. But should there be a common sense and appropriate political thinking in the military environment? The answer to this question will also be completely subjective, that is, depending on personal political preferences.

In today's historical process, in every state, in every society, the army identifies with the defender of the state and the guarantor of security. This is the key question of the army's role in revolutionary events - is the state a people or the state is the power?

*The main material of the article.* An important aspect for the study of the role of the army in the revolutionary events of 1905 – 1907, is a case study, that is, the army itself. It is known that the general and officers of the Russian army consisted of a noble state of society. Soldiers, or lower ranks, were mobilized from the lower classes of society. This very fact testified to the different outlook between the army chiefs and their subordinates. In addition, other factors, such as nationality or religious affiliation, were added to the army. For example, Jewish students in higher education were denied the right to take military exams in the early twentieth century. This was openly stated in a letter from the Observer of the Church-Parish Schools of Odessa County of the Kherson province of the priest Mykola to the Father - the head of the Ochakov school of Archpriest Gavril Sudkovsky, as early as 1902 (*State Archives of Mykolayiv region. Fund 169, Description 1, Case 32: 8*).

Regarding the enlistment of troops to maintain order, there were appropriate instructions. It is known that in July 1905 the governor of the Kherson province V. Levashov sent clarifications to the county officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire regarding the feasibility of calling for military assistance to suppress unrest in the rural area of Kherson province. In particular, it was noted that the following actions of the peasants could be the reason for the intervention of troops to restore order: an open attack by a mob of peasants on private ownership; robbery of the landlord house and property; arson of outbuildings; destroying or illegally collecting bread or other produce from the fields; the forcible seizure of landlords; open resistance of the population to detention of instigators to disobedience to the authorities; unauthorized excommunication of a group of peasants from their place of residence; damage to farm
equipment or machinery to stop ground work; open disobedience to power, expressed in insults or acts of violence against the police, open rebellion or the appearance of an armed crowd (*State Archives of Kherson region. Fund 1. Description 1. Case 60: 29*).

Katerynoslav Governor O. Naydgarth, on April 25, 1905, in a letter to police chief Katerynoslav and all county officials, clarified the privileges and rights of officials when seeking help from military units. He noted that the prerogative of calling for military assistance belonged only to the governor, and that no police or county official had the right to ask military chiefs for military assistance. If necessary, an urgent request for such action was requested by means of a telegraph. There was an exception to this rule, when the rebels had already committed killings, robberies and other violent acts and did not listen to police warnings, then the police authorities had to seek military assistance without waiting for a response from the governor (*State Archives of Dnipropetrovsk Region. Fund 11. Description 1. Case 453: 1*).

However, it should be noted that the place of permanent deployment by the military unit was not secret. Not only the revolutionaries, but also the whole population, knew about it. Sometimes information on the movement of troops appeared on the front pages of fresh local provincial press, or was transmitted through various correspondence. The issue of banning such news in periodicals was repeatedly raised by the authorities, but it was solved only in 1910, according to the military ministry circular No. 4349 of May 23, 1910 (*State Archives of Odesa region. Odesa. Fund 12. Description 1. Case 3: 117*).

The constant deployment of troops in the south of Ukraine prompted officers to make another important change in the revolutionary years of 1905 – 1907 - the need to keep soldiers in constant readiness. Therefore, physical military training was sometimes canceled before the stabilization of the internal political situation in the country. For example, the company commander of 212 infantry Bakhchisarai Regiment, who was in KryvyiRih in 1906 to assist in public order, ordered the subordinate officers not to burden soldiers with drill training in the conditions of mass agrarian riots in the region (*Central State Archive of Public Associations. Kiev. Fund 59. Description 1. Case 360: 629*).
In southern Ukraine the loyalty of the military units to the tsarist power was not stable. So, the report of district general-quartermaster master-general Kalnin to the Nikolaev mayor, dated September 23, 1905, testifies to the inability of the authorities to organize security in the city, relying only on police and army units. It states that there is an urgent need to form a local retired military militia in the city, retaining their pensions and additional funding when performing tasks outside the city. In addition, control over the formation of the militia was entrusted to the Ministry of War (State Archives of Mykolayiv region. Fund 229. Description 4. Case 153:10).

In order to maintain the fighting spirit and control the situation on the spot, the authorities were sent to parts. It is known that in December 1905 to the governor of Kherson province M. Malaeva was addressed by the Deputy Governor S. Gorchakov with the proposal to immediately send to the military units of government officials to control the internal atmosphere in the military environment (State Archives of Kherson region. Fund 1. Description 1. Case 60: 57).

This temporary action had no effect, which, at times, led to the refusal of the authorities to take responsibility for the events. In July 1905, the Chief of the 70th Infantry Division responded to a letter from Katerynoslav Vice Governor V. Lopukhina, about the inability to bear any responsibility for the order and peace in Katerynoslav in case of late support of local provincial authorities by military units. The Head of the 70th Infantry Division emphasized that the Vice-Governor's claims were untrue and most likely resembled an attempt to escape responsibility by having two Cossack regiments in the permanent power of the Katerynoslav Provincial Government (State Archives of Dnipropetrovsk Region. Dnipro. Fund 11. Description 1. Case 450: 73).

It is also important to note the local government's unpreparedness for the revolutionary upheaval. Katerynoslav Governor O. Niedgart, September 13, 1905, received a letter from the headquarters of the 34th Infantry Regiment regarding deficiencies in the organization of military support for the provincial authorities during the riots in 1905. The letter referred to the lack of elementary conditions for soldiers arriving on call for help from the provincial authorities. The elementary was not enough: straw for the soldiers' lodging, a bucket for water, the necessary furniture for the officer's staff, and so on. It was especially emphasized that no one met the soldiers arriving in the
city and often the officers did not know where to spend the night in the city (State Archives of Dnipropetrovsk Region. Dnipro. Fund 11. Description 1. Case 450: 450).

Involvement of military units in another work was also common. It is known that the newspaper “News of the Odessa city administration”, February 9, 1906, wrote that the artillery of loaders in all major and port cities of Russia made the decision not to work on Sundays and public holidays. This decision partially paralyzed the rail freight stations. Therefore, in Odessa, the provincial authorities made the decision to organize loading and unloading with the help of military units (News of Odessa City Administration, 9 February 1906, Nr 32: 1).

Various ministries and agencies of the Russian Empire tried to use the army for their own purposes. Thus, on July 27, 1906, the Echo newspaper published a conflict between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Railways, which arose because of a lack of army units to support the urgent tasks of the two ministries. After a series of looting of trains by revolutionaries, the Ministry of Railways stepped up the work of punitive trains and brought military protection of railways, bridges, trains, and stations to the maximum. In addition, it was decided by the aforementioned ministry to arrange for permanent military escort of cargo on all rail connections.

The Ministry of War did not support the Ministry of Ways' initiative, motivating its refusal to employ troops by suppressing revolutionary population initiatives in major Russian cities. In addition, the Ministry of War strongly opposed the rapprochement of the military contingent with railway workers, among whom were many revolutionaries. It was decided not to stretch troops along the railways, but to concentrate on stabilizing the socio-political situation in major cities, gradually reducing the army contingent on the railways (Echo, 1906, Nr 5: 2).

On December 24, 1905, the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire, on the basis of a report by S. Witte, laid down the basic provisions for the use of troops to suppress riots and revolutionary uprisings. In particular, it was a ban on the actions of the militias against their fellow villagers and a ban on paying more for volunteer service than for military service. This memorial emphasized the important role of the army, as a fundamental element of counter-revolutionary state policy (Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire, 1990: 118-119).
Equally important is the deployment of troops in the Russian Empire. It is known that on the Ukrainian borders of the Russian Empire they provided the service of the 4th and 5th border districts, whose offices were located respectively in Berdichev (since 1903 in Kiev) and in Odessa. The 4th Border District consisted of 5 brigades, the 5th, that is, the southern - four: the Skulian, Izmail, Odesa and Crimea (Borodych, 1999: 2).

In addition to the border forces, other army units located in Kherson, Katerynoslav, Yelisavetgrad, and Tavriy provinces also took part in suppressing the revolutionary uprisings in southern Ukraine. Their dislocation was often influenced by the provincial authorities. Thus, in February 1906, the governor-general of Kherson and the Dnieper governor, in a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief, emphasized the need to place troops on the border of the Kherson district in order to prevent the peasants of the rebellious Dnieper district in Kherson (Central State Archive of Public Associations, Fund 57, Description 1, Case 72: 125).

However, the deployment of troops was disproportionate. Often, the outermost counties of the southern provinces lacked army units. In the certificate of the Kherson province police department in the name of a comrade of the Minister of Internal Affairs, the head of the department police D. Trepova, dated June 10, 1905, noted that the northern counties of Yelisavetgrad province lacked troops to suppress peasant uprisings (Red archive, 1935, № 4: 33).

Facts of clashes of troops with revolutionaries or rebels were reported in reports to local governors, who reported on the events to higher authorities. Yes, Katerynoslav Governor O. Naydgarth, February 21, 1905, in a letter to the Minister of the Interior, A. Bulygin, reported that a company of infantry and hundreds of Cossacks suppressed the uprising of workers on February 20, 1905 in the Bakhmut County at the Shcherbinovsky Mine near the Krivoy Torets station of the Sevastopol railway. Workers demanded a 30% pay bonus and tried to destroy work equipment. Following verbal warnings from military unit commanders, workers opened fire by revolvers. In response, soldiers and Cossacks started firing. Two people were killed, one of whom was a woman. 6 people were injured and 4 people were seriously injured (State Archives of Dnipropetrovsk Region, Fund 11, Description 1, Case 450: 11).

In October 1905, police in Elisavetgrad, together with soldiers, organized a massacre of people following a memorial service for
dead political prisoners. Getting rid of the police uniform one by one, they caught the participants walking from the house of the Public Assembly to the temple on Palace Square (Central State Archive of Public Associations, Fund 59, Description 1, Case 360: 2-3).

The soldiers beat and killed not only the revolutionaries, but also defenseless women and children not involved in the revolution. So, for refusing to give 25 kopecks to a soldier Ignatiev in the Dnieper district of Kherson province, in March 1906, a woman with a child was killed. In order to prevent unnecessary noise, the soldier was tried behind closed doors. The court pronounced the death sentence (Speech, 29 March 1906, Nr 34: 8).

It is known that the ensign of the 205 Ishmael Infantry Regiment of Teplitsky, during the Jewish pogrom in October 1905, openly expressed his disrespect for the Jews. He claimed that Jews would learn what freedom will when he and his soldiers killed at least two or three thousand of them (State Archives of Odesa region. Fund 2, Description 13, Case 5: 6).

Residents of large provincial cities, in order to preserve their lives, tried to bribe commanders of army units. Thus, Osavul Popov, on June 10, 1905, in a report to the head of the training team of the 8th Don Cossack Regiment, noted that on June 10, 1905, during his duty, he was approached by a Jew Galperzon with a large glass of vodka and a piece of cheese, and started brazenly offering treats. Yesavul refused, however, after 15-20 minutes, he was approached by a centurion of Tarasov with sausage and sardines, which he received from a Jew of Goodenstein in good faith. Esavul was offended and requested measures to be taken against the arrogant Jews of Halperzon and Hertenstein (State Archives of Odesa region, Fund 2, Description 13, Case 5: 178).

However, it should be noted that this approach of the civilian population has rarely been effective. It is known that in October 1905, during the Jewish pogrom, 4 infantry and 2 cavalry regiments were stationed, and other military units (more than 10,000 troops) were stationed. With such an accumulation of military pogroms lasted several days (Podolsky, 1995: 630).

Verkhodniprovsky district supervisor, August 13, 1905, in a letter to Katerynoslav Governor O. Naygart, claimed that the guilty soldier in the Jewish pogrom of the village of Likhovka was a retired soldier, Vladimir Chuiko, who called on his fellow villagers for a mass pogrom (State Archives of Dnepropetrovsk Region 3: 115). In the
village of Sofiyivka of the same county, a participant in the pogrom was a soldier named Suchko, who was in the village on vacation on medical grounds (*State Archives of Dnipropetrovsk Region, Dnipro, Fund 11, Description 1, Case 450: 112*).

On January 6, 1905, the Alexandrian district military commander received a letter from the investigator of the Elisavetgrad County Court, requesting that asked to be called soldiers who participate of the Jewish pogrom and their affiliation belong to the military units of the city of Alexandria (*State Archives of Kirovohrad region, Fund 630, Description 1, Case 13: 214*).

Odessa Governor General O. Kaulbars in September 1906, in an encrypted telegram to P. Stolypin noted that the frequent executions of the revolutionaries through the execution had a negative impact on the moral and psychological condition of the soldiers. In view of this, he sought the replacement of executions by soldiers by execution of execution by executioners (*Gernet, 1962: 94*).

According to the decision of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire, from December 16, 1905, the military was forbidden any participation in the meeting or membership in public organizations. The importance for armies to stay out of politics, such as Western European armies, was emphasized. With this decision, the government sought to reduce the influence of the revolutionary parties on the army (*Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire, 1990: 96-98*).

In addition, in the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire, in the criminal provision (article 131), it referred to the punishment for organizers of propaganda work, up to 8 years. However, this did not stop the propaganda work in the army environment by the revolutionary parties (*The code of laws of the Russian Empire. The Code of Criminal and Correctional Penalties, 1916: 503*). The Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire, as early as December 25, 1905, decided to punish revolutionary propagandists in the military environment by a military tribunal (*Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire, 1990: 116-117*).

However, agitation and propaganda only intensified. Particularly active was the propaganda work of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. In October 1905, in an address to the recruits of Odessa, the revolutionaries turned to the feelings and touched on the moral aspect of their future military service. The main thesis of such
appeals was formulated clearly and neatly – soldiers are recruited from peasants and workers to subsequently kill other peasants and workers who embarked on a revolutionary rebellion against power (State Archives of Dnipropetrovsk Region. Scientific-reference library. Collection of unfunded leaflets Dnipro. Fund 29, Description 7, Case 79).

An address from the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party addressed to the army and navy in July 1906 stated that the homeland is cities, villages, and the entire Russian people; every soldier who shot at the people was cursed on behalf of the people until his death, and would never be able to return to his family in his hometown. Besides in the event of a revolutionary uprising in the ranks of its own army, the Russian government agreed with the Austrian and German emperors on military assistance to suppress the uprising and restore order in Russia. In this manner with the agreement on military assistance with other emperors, the Russian Empire's government betrayed the Russian people, so it became outlawed for the people, and received the status of a traitor to the state (State Archives of Dnipropetrovsk Region. Scientific-reference library. Collection of unfunded leaflets Dnipro, Fund 29, Description 7, Case 79: 80).

An important element of anti-government agitation was the government's criticism of the Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. Thus, Simferopol SRs of Jewish descent issued and distributed postcards with peacemaking appeals. The main reason for the war in such leaflets was the desire of the Russian capital to gain a foothold in the Far East, the war with Japan was defined as unnecessary struggle for foreign land (State Archives of Odesa region, Fund 745, Description 1, Case 1: 72).

In the center of Nikolaev, in February 1906, a beggar in military uniform with a plaque on the breast of the Blind constantly appeared. In conversations with passers-by, he noted that he was a disabled person in the Japanese War and for this fate he "thanks" only to the tsar's power. The Nikolaev policeman in an address to the bailiffs of the city emphasized on the political, and therefore dangerous, character of begging of the given person for the power (State Archives of Mykolayiv region, Fund 479, Description 1, Case 290:23).

Although it should be noted that often the military and without propagandists did not perform their tasks, and even showed cowardice. The court martial in Odessa handed down an acquittal to Isakovitch's case in October 1906. Odessa Governor-General O. Kaulbars asked to
close the case. During the investigation, it turned out that some officers showed cowardice during Isakovich's armed resistance to police. The further course of the case could have caused untold damage to the Russian officers, which was dangerous in a revolutionary atmosphere (Polyansky, 1958: 202).

The urgent issue was also the political reliability of recruits. It is known that in October 1906, the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Odessa District was published in the newspaper "Native Territory", which he sent to all his subordinates. The order referred to the mandatory verification of all recruits for political loyalty to power. Close cooperation with the police was envisaged in this matter (Homeland, 1906: 12).

The authorities were constantly monitored for unreliable military personnel. For example, it is known that about 300 people were brought to the tribunal on the basis of unreliability among Black Sea Fleet sailors. Another 500 sailors in Sevastopol and Mykolayiv were under special observation as being prone to revolutionary ideas (Gernet, 1954: 172-173).

In February 1905, the Kherson Provincial Gazette described the dilemma of those days in the form of a dialogue between a worker and a soldier. The worker accused the soldier of cruelty, suggesting to him that upon his release, he would become the same worker, to which the soldier replied that if he was called up for military service, he would have no other choice but to perform to the end of his duty (Kherson provincial news, 1905: 3).

Soldier intimidation and psychological pressure were one of the hallmarks of a revolutionary struggle strategy. Thus, on June 28, 1906, the Kherson police master reported in a report to Kherson that the resident of Kherson A. Fedorov tried to persuade soldiers of the 5th Motor Artillery Park to disobey. He urged the soldiers not to go to the procession in the city on June 29, 1906, intimidated them that because on that day they will allegedly throw bombs at them (Central State Historical Archive. Kiev. Fund 358. Description 1. Case 17: 215).

Odessa Mayor V. Protopopov, on October 12, 1906, in a letter to the Odessa commander of the Gendarmerie, urged to prevent the close location of soldiers with a rebellious crowd. The revolutionaries used this to lure the soldiers to their side (Central State Historical Archive. Kiev 4: 49). Instructions were added to this letter to the Gendarmerie administration from the Odessa mayor V. Protopopov.
The focus was on troop movements. It was noted that it was forbidden to move in the crowd, it was necessary to foresee the route of the crowd and then arrest the leaders and agitators (Central State Historical Archive. Kiev 4:50).

In 1907, the agitation of the revolutionary parties against the mobilization of youth to the ranks of the tsarist army did not cease. However, often the revolutionaries on the contrary facilitated the penetration of their own contingent into the army in order to destabilize the situation in armed formations (State Archives of Mykolayiv region, Fund 441, Description 1, Case 24:28).

Revolutionaries were also involved in active action against the military. Thus, on March 15, 1907, an assistant police officer in Odessa reported in a report to the chief of the Odessa gendarmerie department that revolutionaries were preparing an assassination attempt on the Commander in Odessa. For this purpose, they prepared two secret apartments: along the Boulevard, next to the Volunteer Fleet, whose windows with iron bars were on a level with the sidewalk, and on Pushkinskaya Street in house No. 8, the windows of which also went out. The assassination was assigned to a student Zelentsov, who was to come in officer form personally to the Commander-in-Chief. In the case of Zelentsov's failure, it was planned to extend the bikford cord from the apartment on Boulevard to the mines installed on the pavement. The place was to be watched by sailor-clad revolutionaries who were constantly appearing in the student cafeteria after 4 p.m. The conspirators had to wait for a horse-drawn carriage with their own driver (Central State Historical Archive, Fund 385, Description 1, Case 1696: 91).

About the plan of seizure of power by workers in Nikolaev, it is known from the encrypted telegram from St. Petersburg to the Nikolaev mayor, from August 15, 1906. It stated that the revolutionary parties had trained between 500 and 600 young emissaries to agitate for the revolutionary struggle in the countryside. It was planned to start peasants rebellion, and then in the revolutionary struggle, at the same time in many places, which should lead to complete demoralization of the police and its transition to a revolutionary camp. This would been force the authorities to withdraw troops from the city to suppress agrarian revolts. And it would enable the workers in the cities, without obstacles, to seize power in their own hands (State Archives of Mykolayiv region, Fund 479, Description 1, Case 290: 118).
Those soldiers who crossed over to the revolutionary side were to be referred to the military tribunal, the verdict of which depended on the degree of guilt. The newspaper "ProletarskoeDelo" № 5, dated October 10, 1905, published an article by an unknown author called My Observations and Conclusions, which referred to crimes committed by soldiers in the Kherson Disciplinary Battalion. In particular, there was propaganda and agitation in the soldiers, environment refusal to shoot at the crowd, or firing blank shots instead of combats ones (Central State Archive of Public Associations. Kiev. Fund 57. Description 1. Case 72: 9).

In Kherson, on June 20, 1905, a riot took place in the disciplinary battalion. The soldiers began beating Colonel Davidov because he was bullied to a Tubus soldier who was heart ill and unprepared for planned army training (Central State Archive of Public Associations. Kiev. 3:31). The main leaders of this uprising are the soldiers of the fighter battalion: Rogachev, Parkhomenko, Kharchuk, Ermakov. They were all executed. Other participants in the uprising (31 people) were sentenced to different terms of hard labor or imprisonment (Central State Archive of Public Associations, Fund 57, Description 1, Case 60:20). Details of the execution of soldiers of the Kherson Disciplinary Battalion will become known to the Khersonians after talking with acquaintance executer officer, Officer Mores, who told that 10 soldiers were sentenced to the death row (Central State Archive of Public Associations, Fund 57, Description 1, Case 72: 8).

The revolutionary agitation against the authorities and the army in the post-revolutionary years did not stop. Thus, in the newspaper "Voice of the South", November 14, 1909, an article entitled "Agitator" was published. It referred to a resident of the village of Yasynuvatky, Alexander County, who urged the peasants to openly disobey the authorities: not to pay any taxes or to give children to soldiers. His fellow villagers: M. Kovalenko and I. Varchenko wrote a complaint against him to the chief of the provincial gendarmerie department (Central State Archive of Public Associations, Fund 57, Description 1, Case 91:16).

On the other hand, it was from southern Ukraine, with the exception of the capital provinces of St. Petersburg and Moscow, that the largest donations were made to rebuild the Russian Empire's fleet after the Russo-Japanese War. In 1910, the Kherson province won the first place in the provincial provinces of the Russian Empire in the amount of money raised for this cause - 730 thousand 254 rubles (Novikov, 1993: 17).
The sailors themselves did not see much change in the situation in the fleet of the Russian Empire. One form of passive resistance to power was the flight abroad. Most often sailors were fleeing warships during foreign campaigns. It is no accident, because in England, the USA, France they saw a different attitude to sailors (Najda, 1948: 411).

It is also important to note that the conditions of detention of sailors in prisons for political crimes were unbearable. The detainees were kept cold, starved, many were beaten and tortured endlessly. In the detention homes of St. Petersburg and Sevastopol kept "lower ranks": in 1906 - 821 people; in 1907 - 773; in 1908 - 940; 1909 - 802 (Najda, 1948: 390).

Poor nutrition and hard labor resulted in high mortality and illness rates among sailors. In 1907, the 33,500 "lower ranks" of the entire royal fleet accounted for 30,888 people who needed inpatient treatment. In the same year, 1289 persons and 169 sailors died (Najda, 1948: 408).

The mayor of Odessa A. Grigoryev, on June 14, 1906, received a government telegram from St. Petersburg stating that a message was published in the «Speech» newspaper about soldiers of the Ingul regiment, who were handcuffed and sent to Odessa prison. As a result, the entire prison of Odessa declared a hunger strike (State Archives of Odesa region, Fund 2, Description 4, Case 8118: 1).

As a consequence of such a reactionary approach to solving the revolutionary problem, there was a negative impact on the further formation of healthy army of the Russian Empire. It is well known that the number of unfit for military service has steadily increased. Thus, if at the beginning of the twentieth century the figure of unsuitable youths was about 200 thousand people throughout the Russian Empire, then during the revolution of 1905 – 1907 years – 220300, and on the eve of the First World War – almost 237 thousand people (Mironov, 2002: 40).

Conclusions. Thus, the events of the First Russian Revolution of 1905 – 1907 can be called a test of strength for the army and navy, a test of commitment to military oath of monarchism and the state. Army units and navy in southern Ukraine had a duty to protect the state from invasion of the monarchist system, to forcibly suppress agrarian riots and pogroms in cities. From this point of view, the quality of the military mechanism of the Russian Empire cannot be
objectively evaluated if one relies on the facts of support by individual soldiers or entire units of acts of terror. However, the task assigned by the government to the army units and the dedicated militia was fulfilled and the answer to the question about the specific purpose of the army appeared in itself, according to the results of the revolutionary events - the army of the Russian Empire is the pillar of the political system. The people in this system were the source of regular military mobilization.

This state of affairs is unlikely to satisfy the liberal-opposition population. Society received only limited freedom after the October manifest of Nicholas II. Radicalized revolutionary figures were not convinced by the authorities of the "fallacy" of their beliefs, but on the contrary, repressed in accordance with the active governmental policy of 1906-1909. The same ones who went past prison or hard labor did not cease their revolutionary activity and went on to an underground organization. Another adventurous decision of Nicholas II on Russia's participation in the global military conflict of 1914, led to a new criticism of the authorities and the activation of a new wave of revolutionary agitation in society.
Держархів Миколаївської області. Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. 479. Оп. 1. Спр. 290.
Держархів Одеської області. Державний архів Одеської області. Ф. 12. Оп. 1. Спр. 3.
Держархів Одеської області. Державний архів Одеської області. Ф. 2. Оп. 13. Спр. 3.
Держархів Одеської області. Державний архів Одеської області. Ф. 2. Оп. 13. Спр. 5.
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РЕВОЛЮЦІЙНІ ТА КОНТРРЕВОЛЮЦІЙНІ ПОДІЇ В АРМІЇ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ІМПЕРІЇ НА ПІВДНІ УКРАЇНИ В РОКИ ПЕРШОЇ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ

У статті описується роль армії Російської імперії в придушенні масових заворушень в роки Першої російської революції на півдні України. Автор статті намагається дослідити революційний дух в армійському середовищі під час революції 1905–1907 років.

Основна увага приділяється дислокації військ в Україні напередодні та під час революції 1905–1907 років. Наголошується на тому, що переміщення військових вільно висвітлювалося пресою, що надавало змогу революціонерам орієнтуватися згідно з ситуацією. Саме тому про переміщення військ відповідно до циркуляра Воєнного міністерства № 4349 від 23 травня 1910 року стало державною таємницею. Питання залучення військ до придушення революційних настроїв розглядається всебічно: від конфлікту Воєнного міністерства із Міністерством шляхів сполучення до прерогатив виклику армійських підрозділів місцевою губернською владою.

Відзначається нестача військових підрозділів в деяких революційно-активних регіонах південної України, що свідчить про розмах революційного руху. Внаслідок цього описується утворення народного ополчення у стабілізації внутрішньої політичної ситуації. Відмічений спроби не допустити проникнення у військове середовище політично неблагонадійних осіб, особливо призовників. Однак не зухвалі революціонерів від активізації антидержавної пропаганди, яка проявлялася в різних формах: від акцій залякування та відкритої агітації до спланованих спроб замаху на життя високих військових чинів.

Автор наводить яскравий приклад непокори військових, який мав місце в червні 1905 року в Херсонському дисциплінарному батальйоні. Описується й психологічна складова солдатської відповідальності на прикладі участі солдатів в розстрільних командах, що відзначається як де мотивуючий аспект військової служби.

Додатковою, але не менш важливою інформацією є негативна роль участі армійських підрозділів у стабілізації внутрішньої політичної ситуації на Півдні України. Зокрема, йдеться про участі солдатів в масових погромах, особливо стосовно єврейського населення. Автор відстоює думку, що російська армія на початку ХХ століття не була захисником російського народу, а залишалася «хоронцем» політичної монархічної моделі, її важливим сегментом безпеки.

Ключові слова: Перша російська революція, Південь України, армія, флот, РСДРП.