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THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY SYSTEM: ISSUES OF CAPABILITY IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR IN UKRAINE

In the article, the processes of formation and functioning of collective security systems are considered in the context of the dynamics of socio-political transformations of the second half of the XX - early XXI centuries in Europe and the world. The authors summarize those aspects of the problematic whose interpretations relate, in particular, to the difference in military capabilities of individual EU member states, the asymmetry in understanding of geopolitical priorities, and the ambiguity of prospects for both cooperation and confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation in the security sphere. Resisting the Russian Federation's ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine is argued as a challenge to the European security system. It is emphasized that the tests to which the ability of the current security system to provide guarantees to the member states was subjected necessitated substantial changes in it. The institutional processes of the 21st century made changes possible but did not provide sufficiently effective tools to influence the aggressor in case of systematic violations of international law. The need to develop common approaches to the identification of processes and phenomena of military-political reality, to criteria for determining on-the-brink war and peace states, as well as the role of warring countries in them is proven.

Keywords: international security, collective security systems, European security system, military cooperation between states, war in Ukraine.

Statement of the problem and its relevance. The end of the «Cold War» period in the last quarter of the twentieth century took place against the background of the collapse processes of the USSR, democratic revolutions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and, as a result, the formation of a number of independent states in this region. The chance to create a new security system involving the

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countries of the former Soviet dictatorship was accepted and used by the leadership of the USA and NATO, in particular, by implementing the policy of expanding NATO to the East and providing assistance to the post-Soviet countries in carrying out democratic reforms in order to prevent the revival of dictatorial regimes. However, this caused an increase in confrontation with the Russian Federation, whose government interpreted NATO's actions as a threat to its security. The beginning of Russia's armed aggression against Georgia and the illegal annexation of its territories in 2008 became a new impetus for the aggravation of international relations. Subsequently, in 2014, the illegal annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea by the Russian Federation and its use of separatist movements in the Ukrainian Donbas to create artificial quasi-state entities (LPR, DPR) on this territory led to an armed confrontation on the demarcation line with Ukraine for the next 8 years that latter in 2022 turned into the full-scale current war with actual occupation of big part of Ukrainian territory. The countries of the democratic West, on the other hand, had to deal with the necessity to respond promptly to the aggressor's demonstrative disregard for the norms of international law and legal practices of humanitarian law which are universally recognized by the civilized world. Not having perfect tools to influence the aggressor, the international community commenced the intensive search of the latter. It was about finding ways and opportunities to stop, for example, the use by the aggressor of prohibited types of weapons, the widespread use of inhumane practices in the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians, etc. The global and European security systems, integration structures, national governments, European and world community were mostly aware of the threats of a global nuclear war and were concerned about the threats to the existence of all mankind in the circumstances that were becoming increasingly tragic in the first months of the war. The latter caused the crisis of European security policy and the need to find new means of deterring potential aggressors and ensuring peace in the region. Obviously, following the results of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the issue of creating new security architecture and Ukraine's role in it at the regional and global levels will arise which actualizes the problematic of the article.

Analysis of previous research and publications. International security issues are actively studied not only by scientists, but also by political and military figures and are constantly in focus of attention of the world community. A significant contribution to the study of the

evolution of European security and defense policy development was made by such foreign scientists as Coyle J., Kojen R., Mihalka M., Osborn A., Pszczel R., Shay D. Walt S., Hitchcock W., Zak A. and others. The works of Ukrainian scientists Andrushchenko S., Olevskiy V., Rechych S., Sydorenko A., Yakovyuk I. and others are also devoted to the analysis of the processes of creation and formation of the common EU foreign security policy. At the same time, the variability of the military and political situation in the world, the war in Ukraine and other challenges and threats lead to a constant search for new approaches to solving security issues.

The research methodology is determined by the processes of formation and functioning of collective security systems, which are considered in the dynamics of socio-political and military-political transformations of the second half of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries in Europe and the world. The consequences of the reduction of the military-technical potential of the EU member states, within the framework of the détente policy, against the background of the Russian Federation's claims for dominance in the Eastern European region after the collapse of the USSR are characterized. The role of NATO enlargement in ensuring European security is analyzed; also the author summarizes those aspects of the problem whose interpretations relate, in particular, to the difference in military potentials of individual EU member states; asymmetry in understanding of geopolitical priorities and the ambiguity of prospects for both cooperation and confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation in the domain of security. The civilizational significance of Ukraine's position in resisting the Russian Federation's ongoing full-scale invasion is argued. The latter is regarded as a challenge to the European security system, the conceptual foundations of which were set up during the first quarter of the 21st century. The nature of the institutional processes of the first quarter of the 21st century was revealed; the processes in question made changes possible, but did not provide sufficiently effective tools to influence the aggressor in case of systematic violations of international law, or the use by the occupying forces of practices against prisoners of war and the civilian population unacceptable from the point of view of humanitarian law. The necessity to develop common approaches to the identification of processes and phenomena of military-political reality, criteria for determining the edge states of war and peace, as well as the role and place of belligerent countries in them is proven.

The purpose and objectives of the research. The purpose of the article is to analyze the military-political situation in the world that developed after the end of the Second World War and to discover the reasons that led to a new period of confrontation between the East and the West, which, in turn, led to the destruction of the communist bloc and the bipolar world. The task is to identify ways to create a new system of European security, as the one in effect demonstrated its imperfections in connection with the Russian attack on Ukraine and illegal annexation of its territories.

Presentation of the main research material. The European collective security system was created after the end of the Second World War when the bipolar system of international relations was formed in the world. The transition in 1947 to the confrontation between the West and the USSR actualized the problem of increasing security guarantees in Europe. The first step in this direction was forming a defense alliance between France and Great Britain in 1947 per the provisions of the Dunkirk Treaty. It became an important step towards the organization of collective defense. based on the Brussels Pact and the North Atlantic Pact (Treaty, art. 10). The process of integration of European countries in the field of security was initiated on March 17, 1948 by the Conclusion of the Brussels Treaty between Belgium, Great Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and France, which provided for joint activities in the economic, social and cultural spheres and in the field of defense. In the face of growing tensions in Europe and blocking the work of the UN Security Council by the Soviet Union on April 4, 1949, twelve states of Europe and North America signed the Washington Treaty on NATO, despite the sharp protest of the USSR (Kalyayev, 2020).

After the end of the Second World War, a bipolar system of international relations was formed in the world. The transition in 1947 to direct confrontation between the West and the USSR actualized the problem of increasing security guarantees in Europe. The first step in this direction was the formation of a defense alliance between France and Great Britain in 1947 in accordance with the provisions of the Dunkirk Treaty. It became an important step towards the organization of collective defense (Treaty, art. 10). The process of integration of European countries in the field of security was initiated on March 17, 1948, by the Conclusion of the Brussels Treaty between Belgium, Great Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France, which provided

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Already in the early 50s of the twentieth century in Europe there were attempts to create its own security structure. The idea of creating a "European army", which became the basis of the military-political integration project, belonged to W. Churchill, and he made it public on August 11, 1950 at the Council of Europe Assembly. He proposed to create a "European army" that would include German military units as well. This proposal was included in the resolution of the Council of Europe Assembly "On the immediate creation of a united European army". It was assumed that the European army would be integrated with the army of the North Atlantic Alliance. It was assumed that the European army would consist of small national units, combined into larger mixed formations, and would be linked to the political institutions of a united Europe (Hitchcock, 1998, p.134).

According to I.Yakovyuk (2017), "the history of the creation and decline of the European Defense Community has shown that any initiative to integrate European countries in the military-political sphere is doomed to failure without support from the United States; the European defense union cannot be created as completely autonomous from NATO; and integration in the military-political sphere is the most difficult problem due to the fears of member states to finally lose their sovereignty" (Yakovyuk&Orlovskii, 2017, p. 275).

Although the formation of the European security system was carried out by European countries that were EU member states, the European security policy was conducted on the basis of NATO. At the same time, the development and formation of such a security policy took place through the joint efforts of the EU and NATO. The first real steps in the domain of defense integration were taken by the EU only after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (Kalyayev et al., 2020).

The successive demilitarization of international relations in Europe and the world as a whole, the gradual transition to dialogue and cooperation in relations between East and West, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization, and the collapse of the Soviet Union had a significant impact on the activities of the North Atlantic Alliance and

the entire European security system. The reaction of NATO and the EU leadership to changes in the military and political situation was reflected in attempts to transform the security system and adapt it to new conditions (Olevskiy, 2011, pp. 3–12). In addition, NATO's expansion to the East was determined by the post-Cold War balance of powers, where the USA prevailed because its main adversary - Russia - was weakened by the internal chaos caused by the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s and could not prevent this process (Kalyayev et al., 2019).

At the peak of the Cold War in the mid-1980s of the twentieth century, the NATO Armed Forces, according to the London Institute for Strategic Studies, numbered about 5 million people (with reserves of more than 9.5 million), more than 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 440 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers, about 25,000 tanks, 8,000 combat aircraft (including more than 2,000 carriers of nuclear weapons) and about 2,000 warships. The main forces of military groups were concentrated in Europe (Rechyh, 2012, p. 23). A significant factor in the bloc's combat capability was the presence of the US armed forces on the European continent. These are 360,000 military personnel and dozens of bases, airfields and other military facilities (200 military facilities in Germany, 20 bases in England, 4 bases in Greece, up to 60 military facilities in Turkey, including 6 bases; in Denmark - 3 naval bases and 4 airfields, as well as bases in Norway, Iceland, Spain, Italy). The post of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe was permanently held by an American general (appointed for three years) (Rechyh, 2012, p. 25).

The policy of détente led to a decrease in the level of confrontation. Since 1990, “defense expenditures in NATO member states were reduced by 22%. The number of conventional armed forces was significantly reduced: the ground forces that the member states put at the disposal of the Alliance were reduced by 35%; the number of naval ships was reduced by more than 30%, and the number of combat units of the Air Force was reduced by 40%. Two thirds of the front-line forces were withdrawn from Germany and the advanced combat aviation stationed there was reduced by 70%. The US Armed Forces in Europe were reduced to 100,000” (Rechyh, 2012, p. 26).

However, the problems of European security remained. The political processes that were taking place in the post-Soviet countries caused concern among Western politicians because they were accompanied

by the collapse of the political system, crisis processes in the economy, social sphere, governance institutions, and, above all, in the armed forces. The leadership of the Russian Federation, which declared itself the legal successor of the USSR, from its first steps, sought to preserve its dominant role in the region and the right to influence its neighbors. Armed conflicts arose and were developing between different ex-Soviet republics. Those involved the North Caucasus, Transnistria, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, etc. The countries of the former Soviet camp saw no other way to protect themselves than membership in NATO, which remained the only guarantor of security.

Despite the fact that the US military contingent in Europe had decreased since the Cold War from 400,000 soldiers to 79,000 (2019), it still remained the major factor in the pan-European defense system. NATO, with strong US leadership, remained essential to the success of democracy in the newest states of the alliance. It was believed that the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the states east of the old NATO perimeter could lead to unrest or even war. After 1991, supporters of NATO enlargement, such as Z. Brzezinski, insisted on expanding NATO by including countries that had political influence in dangerous regions. The regions in question were the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, W. Perry, the US Secretary of Defense from February 1994 to January 1997, expressed anxiety that rapid expansion would harm US relations with Russia (Menon & Ruger, 2020).

However, in January 1994, NATO members agreed to accept new members and in March 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were granted the membership. In 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became NATO members. Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009, Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020, increasing NATO membership since the peak of the Cold War from 16 to 30 in two decades (Enlargement, 2020).

The development of the European security system was consolidated on December 16, 2002 by the adoption of the EU-NATO Declaration on the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP, ESDP). Given the extent of NATO's military dependence on the United States, Washington has committed itself to playing a major military role in defending the coalition of states that have scant military resources and whose geographic location gives the Russian army a clear advantage in conducting military operations against them or for missions aimed at destabilizing them without resorting to war (Coyle, 2018).

According to some American authors, the strategic benefits obtained by NATO's enlargement policy have also led to negative consequences, one of which was the role it played in the final transformation of Russia from a predictable partner of the West into an adversary. At the same time, the tension between the Russian Federation and the West was not the reason for NATO enlargement and the spread of democracy in the countries of the former Soviet camp. The reason was the complex political and cultural trends of the domestic political situation in the Russian Federation, in particular the rise of authoritarianism in government and nationalism in Russian society. President V. Putin's sharp speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 was supposed to symbolize Russia's political renaissance, its determination to resist what it considered a diminishing of its sphere of influence at the verge of centuries, and its new strategic outlook.

The war between Russia and Georgia 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine in 2014, its active participation in armed confrontation of LPR, DPR with Ukraine during the following 8 years demonstrated that Russia had gained sufficient strength to confront the West and strategically reassessed the concept of its military policy in the direction of restoring its geopolitical influence. At the same time, Russia practically fully financially supported the LPR and the DPR, ensuring their economic, political and military functioning from its own state budget. In these territories, provocative actions and manipulations were carried out consistently and systematically around the idea of statehood, citizenship, historical and cultural unity with Russia, not only of these regions, but also of other regions of Ukraine.

The opinion of L. Novak-Kalyayeva, who characterized this situation as a vestige of the collapse of the USSR, the end of the bipolar system of international relations, and the search for the most appropriate replacement for it, has not lost its relevance. As well as tension in defining positions regarding an adequate concept of security in new geopolitical conditions. According to the researcher, "In the broadest sense, the events in the southeast of Ukraine can be perceived as a reason for clarifying ripe global, regional, and national problems in various spheres of the functioning of government and society in current configurations that generally have a civilizational significance". And the statement that the undeclared war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in this context threatens to turn into a frozen

“zero-sum” conflict when any solution that satisfies one country will be unequivocally unacceptable for the other – in current circumstances, is gaining character of prophecy (Novak-Kalyayeva, 2017, pp. 125–138).

The US support for the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine of 2014, which overthrew pro-Russian President V. Yanukovich, for the Russian leadership meant the US interference in Ukraine’s internal politics with the aim of joining the West, which disrupted the Kremlin’s plans. Russian leaders have been deeply concerned about the consequences of Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO, as they have always considered Ukraine as culturally, demographically, economically and geostrategically the largest post-Soviet state which is doomed to be in the sphere of RF influence. Moreover, NATO gave them good reasons to believe that the Ukraine’s chances of joining were significant. This angered Putin and he warned that “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions (Zak, 2017, pp. 153–154). Addressing a group of Russian ambassadors in July 2018, V.Putin, referring to the West, warned that "our colleagues who... seek to include Georgia and Ukraine, in particular, in the orbit of the alliance, should think about the possible consequences of such an irresponsible policy. We will respond appropriately to such steps that pose a direct threat to Russia" (Osborn, 2018).

These statements indicate an attempt to block the admittance of these two countries to the alliance and undermine the unity of NATO. At the same time, society is still looking for answers to the question whether it would have been possible to deter Russia if Georgia and Ukraine had been NATO members. Russia’s policy in relation to Ukraine should be considered in this context.

Against this background, the full-scale war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022 with the invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine along the entire length of the Russian-Ukrainian and, partially, the Ukrainian-Belarusian border largely determined the dynamics of the development of the modern military and political situation in Europe and the world. Considering the events of the last 8 years in the southeast of Ukraine, this war should have been completely predictable and natural. Therefore, it should not have come as a surprise. At the same time, the Ukrainian government, like most governments and officials of Western countries until 24.02.2022, mostly remained confident that this time again it would be done with just threats and demonstrations of force, and it would not come to a

"big war". But the hopes of Western governments and global security structures for a quick resolution of the situation, and not in favor of Ukraine, did not come true.

All components of the military potential of the aggressor country, including high-tech military equipment and a substantial part of the weapons preserved from the Soviet times, were involved in the full-scale invasion with the establishment of the occupation regime on a significant territory of Ukraine. The occupying forces did not restrain in looting and using terrorist inhumane practices against prisoners of war and the civilian population. War crimes, a large part of which have already been documented, have become a daily phenomenon among servicemen of all branches of the armed forces and special forces, and the notions of officer honor and soldierly valor have been completely compromised by Russian regular and private military contingents.

The massive purposeful destruction of critical infrastructure, housing and cultural heritage of the Ukrainian people confirm the validity of the interpretation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a genocide of the Ukrainian people.

Taking into account the difference in military potential, as well as the attitude towards Ukraine as a country unable to offer any significant resistance to the aggressor, the European establishment and the general public prevalingly expected its quick defeat in this war and the resolution of the conflict in favor of the aggressor. However, everyone was literally shocked by the course of events that, contrary to expectations, unfolded in Ukraine. The unprecedented consolidation of the Ukrainian people, the army and the government in confronting the armed aggression proved that there will be no quick victory and no aggressor's victory as such. This became the Ukrainian phenomenon that not only aroused the admiration and respect of the entire democratic world, but also fundamentally changed both the positions in the global and regional security systems on the international arena, as well as the prospects for Ukraine's participation and place in them.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the desire of the EU to become an independent center of power with its own course in world politics and capable of protecting its interests began to take shape, which led to the revision of the EU's positions (Walt, 2005, p. 129). In general, there was an intense struggle between the three main approaches to the Common Security and Defense Policy (hereinafter referred to as the CSDP). Different interests of EU members, as well as resources

and, importantly, different security cultures turned into factors that guided institutional reforms at the level of ESDP. Strengthening the military component, increasing professionalism and capabilities of the military, improving decision-making structures, and transforming the EU into an independent and autonomous player in this area - this was the position of the French managerial and military elites. The UK leadership shared the position of France and was aware of the paradigm shift and the need to increase the military power of the EU member states. At the same time, preserving the central role of NATO as the main instrument of European defense was not rejected. Duplication of institutional structures of the alliance at the European level remained a problem, though (Andrushchenko, 2011).

The main problem in this dimension should be considered not so much the content of the fundamental EU legislative acts, but the mechanisms of their implementation. The Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the EU Satellite Center, and the Information Collection and Preservation Center became the institutional basis for the implementation of the idea of pan-European security system in the EU. The ultimate goal of these efforts was the establishment of a 60,000-troop European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) with its own command, communications, intelligence, naval contingent and aviation to carry out humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping operations or crisis management combat operations.

Apart from these functional tasks, the creation of the ERRF by the countries of the European Union was primarily aimed at proving the EU's ability to implement an independent policy in the field of security and defense on the European continent and to get rid of dependence on the United States in solving purely European affairs. This, according to European politicians, could provide an opportunity to institutionally affirm the EU as a strong, independent geopolitical actor.

To conceptually support this policy, the European Security Strategy was adopted in 2003, which reflected common to the EU member states threats, goals and objectives in the field of security and defense. The provisions of the Strategy were recorded at the summit of the European Union on December 13, 2007 in the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (European Security Strategy, 2009). The Treaty provides for collective responsibility of the EU member states,

mandatory provision of assistance by all possible means to the country that becomes a victim of aggression. The provision of the Treaty of Lisbon for the United Europe on "mutual assistance" actually duplicates the Fifth Article of the Washington Treaty on establishing NATO. The North Atlantic Alliance is characterized by the Strategy as one of the main elements of the international security system.

The issue of creating a European Defense Union which will assist NATO has been on the agenda since 2014 in connection with the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation. According to the plan, the creation of the European Defense Union in partnership with NATO will allow the EU to act autonomously in operations abroad to stabilize the neighboring areas and enhance its role as a guarantor of security. The European Parliament resolution proposed to establish the Directorate General for Defense, which would be responsible for internal aspects of defense and security policy at the EU level, as well as to create a European Intelligence Agency.

In early December 2017, the EU Council adopted a decision on the implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) programme - Permanent structured cooperation in the field of defense of the EU member states. The programme was supposed to allow to jointly countering military threats from Russia and strengthening the defense capabilities of the European Union, if disputes between the participants do not interfere with this. The main goal of the strategy in the field of defense is to increase the EU's capacity to act autonomously from NATO if necessary, to strengthen its security capabilities through deepening cooperation between member states on the effective use of available resources, along with the parallel increase in defense budgets (Dossi & Keohane, 2019).

At the first stage, the issues of providing medical assistance, joint use of transport aviation, exchange of intelligence data should be coordinated from the pan-European center. The first result of such integration initiatives was the formation of the EU Military Planning Conduct and Capability Facility. Although it is not yet a classic full-fledged military headquarters, it will be responsible for EU military operations. However, the EU does not plan to distance itself from NATO, but instead deepens cooperation with the alliance. According to experts, Europe is powerless without American military-strategic, satellite, intelligence capabilities and air defense technologies. The implementation of PESCO projects should improve the defense capacity

of EU member states, in particular the ability to withstand challenges and threats from Russia. In contemporary conditions the EU countries are not able to guarantee their security alone in the event of a threat of military conflict, because their defense expenditures and potential in the field of security do not meet the requirements of modern times. The main objective for the development of European military power requires the ability to quickly deploy (within 60 days) and maintain operationally powerful forces for at least a year.

The Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of defense and security currently involves 25 participating countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. The goal of creating smaller rapid response units that will be at a very high level of readiness has also been defined. Achieving the stated goal is significantly hampered by the crisis phenomena in the European Union, caused by both internal events and external factors, which has been particularly evident recently.

On June 17, 2019, the Defense Ministers of Germany, France, and Spain approved Europe's largest defense project - the air combat system of the future, which should be ready for combat use by 2040. The total cost of the project is estimated at up to 50 billion euros. Also, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of all 28 EU countries approved the "EU Global Strategy", which describes common defense and security capabilities and considers ways to further strengthen the role of the European Union as a global player. Some researchers in the field of international security have suggested that the new EU strategy could initiate European strategic culture as an integral element of military alliances and political organizations. At the same time, it was interpreted as one of the "most serious challenges, since all member states have their own history and national traditions, and extraordinarily, the content of these traditions suggests the presence of contradictions between their own reality and the wider European stratum" (Howorth, 2007). The general content of the ESDP allows us to conclude that, in fact, the EU uses a wide range of instruments in its security and defense policy. These tools have become an integral part of the concept of "soft power" (Shay, 2019). The effectiveness of the latter in the face of armed aggression is not unambiguous.

From the beginning of armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine the countries of the democratic West found themselves facing the need to respond promptly to the aggressor's demonstrative disregard for the norms of international law and legal practices of humanitarian law generally recognized by the civilized world. Not having effective tools to influence the aggressor, the international community turned to their intensive search. It was a search for opportunities to put an end to the use by the aggressor, for example, of prohibited types of weapons, the widespread use of inhumane practices in the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians, etc. Global and European security systems, integration structures, national governments, and European and world community were mostly aware of the threats of a global nuclear war and were concerned about the threats to the existence of all mankind in the circumstances that were becoming increasingly tragic in the first months of the war. The latter caused the crisis of European security policy and the need to find new means of deterring potential aggressors and ensuring peace in the region. Obviously, the results of the Russian-Ukrainian war will raise the issue of creating a new security architecture and Ukraine's role in it at the regional and global levels.

Russia's attack on Ukraine destroyed all the plans of the European leadership and NATO. As a member of the UN Security Council, Russia grossly violated the basic principles of collective security and created a precedent for the redistribution of the world order through the use of force. Opportunities for solving this crisis lie in the area of identifying problems and inconsistencies in international legal norms regarding the possibilities of preventing and eliminating military conflicts, providing proposals and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of functioning of the UN governing structures and regional security systems.

NATO and the European Union responded largely effectively in the first months of the war. The US leadership once again proved its importance by successfully mobilizing international efforts, especially regarding the coordination of providing military support to Ukraine. NATO's response to the war, which had to balance between increasingly powerful support for Ukraine and justifiable avoidance of open conflict with Russia, was more or less justified. Most European countries have turned to the proven protective umbrella of NATO, supported by American forces and assets. The Big Seven and the EU proved their liveliness by strengthening sanctions (Pszczel, 2022).

The war has not yet tested the reliability of the guarantees of collective defense under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. So far, the mere existence of Article 5, along with NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (which currently consists of over 40,000 troops under NATO's direct operational command), has provided sufficient deterrence. At the same time, the fall of a Ukrainian air defense missile on the territory of Poland, which led to the deaths of residents of the advanced NATO country, caused concern of the Alliance leadership, which realized that Russian aggression had already crossed the borders. The question on the agenda was: firstly, how to respond to such incidents, and secondly, how to protect the airspace on the borders of NATO. Unfortunately, the leadership has not developed a clear algorithm of actions yet. The NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized that Russia is responsible for the war in Ukraine, and the incident in Poland is directly related to this. He added that there is no indication that the missile strike in Poland was deliberate and that the Russian Federation was planning an attack on NATO. That is, the Western leaders again did not want to escalate the confrontation with the Russian Federation. As we know, Poland appealed to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that the parties "will hold joint consultations when, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties are threatened." Based on the content of those consultations, it can be concluded that the direct guilt of the Russian Federation in the missile strike has not been proven. But everyone understood that from now on no state is guaranteed from attack, which is why the Alliance must improve its air defense. First of all, this concerns NATO partners such as Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic states, which directly border Russia and Ukraine. In this context, German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht offered support to Poland, in particular, with Patriot defense systems and Eurofighter jets (Germany offers, 2022).

This once again shows that NATO does not lose its importance for preserving the security of its members and providing a stable framework within which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can develop peacefully. However, in order to fulfill this task effectively, NATO itself must change significantly. The main reform plans were announced in NATO's New Strategic Concept approved in Madrid on June 29, 2022, which leaves no doubt about the role that nuclear weapons will continue to play in the Alliance's overall security of. But in order to

neutralize the corrosive influence of Moscow's nuclear blackmail of the Allies, a tougher declaratory NATO nuclear policy is needed. Moreover, the use of nuclear weapons against targets in Ukraine - no matter how improbable it may seem - cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, the Allies need to urgently consider convincing signals to Russia regarding the military response by conventional military means (for example, the elimination of Russian military targets in the Black Sea), that could result from such actions. Only the obviousness of a retaliatory strike can stop the Kremlin from seriously considering such an option.

A substantial and permanent military presence, supported by pre-deployed military equipment and strategic deployment of combat units, is now part of NATO's new military model. The task of mass reinforcement of troops of a high level of combat readiness is central to effective deterrence. The reliability of collective defense will also depend on the rapid implementation of already announced promises to increase defense spending and prioritize defense planning based on the scenario of a large-scale conflict in Europe. In this context, relevant stocks of military equipment are essential. Since current levels are clearly insufficient, the procurement practices and production capacity of the military industry must be adapted and stocks rapidly replenished.

In the new strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance, as noted by A. Sydorenko (2022), it is expedient to identify 7 threats that the Alliance has determined as priorities and which it plans to combat: Russia (a potentially authoritarian state) and, as part of the Russian threat, Belarus, due to its "military integration" with the Russian Federation; terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations." Terrorists are now receiving more and more high-tech lethal weapons. The negative role of private military companies, non-state armed groups, in particular as members of transnational terrorist networks, is emphasized; conflicts and instability in Africa and the Middle East. (intensified by the food crisis caused by Russia's attack on Ukraine); the Alliance's policy towards China, taking into account its rapprochement with the Russian Federation; abuses in cyberspace and in the field of the latest technologies; destruction of the arms control system; climate changes (Sydorenko, 2022). According to experts, the implementation of this document depends on the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war, after which the security situation in Europe might change again, but the variety of challenges and threats to NATO will remain.

We are entering the era of a multipolar world, where non-state actors are often the source of threats, so both NATO and Ukraine must find their places and roles in the new realities. In our opinion, it is impossible to create a new security system without Ukraine due to the following factors: Firstly, due to its geopolitical location and size, Ukraine will remain one of the largest countries in Europe bordering the EU. This justifies the realization by Ukraine of the main task for the European security system in the face of imperial and geopolitical ambitions of Asian Russia, which, in our opinion, will not abandon them even after defeat in the war. Secondly, after the war, Ukraine will have the second to none armed forces with real combat experience, which makes them capable of carrying out any complex mission aimed to repel aggression or conduct peacekeeping operations under the UN auspices, etc. Thirdly, the uncompromising heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people for their independence will contribute to raising the international prestige of Ukraine as a global player defending the democratic principles of the world order. Fourthly, the international economic integration of Ukraine and its aspiration to join the EU will contribute to the activation of the development of the Ukrainian market through the inflow of foreign investments, which, in its turn, should find its reflection in the strengthening of the Ukrainian segment of the European market, including the field of production of weapons and military equipment, given the modernization of Ukraine's military industrial complex according to NATO standards.

Meanwhile, the course of events proves that neither the EU countries, nor the USA have a single consolidated position regarding Ukraine, and regarding the place and role of the Russian Federation in the post-war world, or the principles of creating a radically new security system. It implies that there are proposals to achieve peace at the cost of concessions from Ukraine, guaranteeing security for the aggressor country, limiting military aid to Ukraine, etc. All of this is related to various political circumstances which depend on the unity of democratic forces in the struggle for the future of human civilization.

Conclusions. State security policy in the EU member states must be viewed through the prism of two interrelated trends: the intensification of the struggle for the expansion of national interests and for the leadership in the EU geopolitical space, and Russia's attempts to restore its lost influence on the international arena at any cost. This, in turn, requires substantial reforms and closer

consolidation of the actions of international institutions, primarily the UN and the UN Security Council, the IMF, the WTO, especially with regard to holding the aggressor accountable for violating the norms of international law.

It is necessary to ensure the unity and compatibility of the military-strategic plans of all EU defense institutions of different levels with NATO, along with the creation of a centralized command system (joint command), whose decisions must be mandatory to comply for all countries that are part of the collective defense system. This implies the possibility of limiting national sovereignties to the extent required by military and political reality.

It is advisable to introduce a unified monitoring system for strategic and operational identification of dangers and threats, as well as the effectiveness of existing security and defense institutions. It is important to optimize all defense institutions by both informatizing management systems and providing highly qualified management personnel with experience in anti-crisis management and organization of counteraction to hybrid threats. In a multipolar world, non-state actors often constitute the source of threats. Therefore, NATO must find its place and its role in the system of ensuring European security in the new realities. The North Atlantic Alliance needs to return to its original function of "collective defense", which has turned out to be somewhat blurred since the end of the "Cold War". In the future, NATO should become a basic element of a more global international security architecture, and its area of responsibility should be expanded, and, under certain circumstances, it may go beyond the borders the borders of its member states.

For a long time European security and defense issues remained somewhat insensitive to the respective policies of the member states and the EU's common security policy, and governments and leaders were not ready to introduce a military dimension into its implementation. The issue of insufficient financing of defense and security needs by European countries has become a chronic problem for EU member states. Therefore, a reassessment of collective views on the dangers and risks of the Alliance's split should be considered an important component of ensuring collective security in the new geopolitical environment.

The heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people and unprecedented financial, technological, political and moral support of the Euro-Atlantic

and world democratic community, military valor and high professionalism of the Ukrainian army and its military command along with the active position of the military-political command of European democratic countries and the world, the constructiveness of their leaders, government officials and diplomatic corps testify to the sustainability of the trends in the development of the military-political situation. In this new geopolitical reality, new requirements for acceptable political, economic, ideological positions and algorithms of military-political actions are being formed. Many phenomena and processes that constitute the essence of these changes have not yet been defined, hypotheses about their origin have not been identified and articulated, their potential and impact on society and governance has not been argued and justified. Therefore, the outlined issues will become the subject of in-depth study by politicians, government officials and scientists working in the field of political, military, humanitarian and social sciences for a long time.

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Система євроатлантичної безпеки: проблеми спроможності в умовах війни в Україні

У статті процеси формування та функціонування систем колективної безпеки розглядаються в контексті динаміки суспільно-політичних трансформацій другої половини ХХ – початку ХХІ століть в Європі та світі. Автори узагальнюють ті аспекти проблематики, інтерпретації яких стосуються, зокрема, різниці у військовому потенціалі окремих держав-членів ЄС, асиметрії в розумінні геополітичних пріоритетів, неоднозначності перспектив як співпраці, так і протистояння у сфері безпеки між НАТО та Російською Федерацією. Опір повномасштабному вторгненню військ Російської Федерації в Україну розглядається як виклик європейській системі безпеки. Наголошується, що випробування, яким була піддана здатність чинної системи безпеки надавати гарантії державам-учасникам, зумовили необхідність її суттєвих змін. Інституційні процеси ХХІ століття уможливили зміни, але не надали достатньо ефективних інструментів впливу на агресора у разі систематичних порушень міжнародного права. Доведено необхідність вироблення єдиних підходів до ідентифікації процесів і явищ військово-політичної дійсності, до критеріїв визначення станів на межі війни і миру, а також ролі в них країн, що воюють.

Ключові слова: міжнародна безпека, системи колективної безпеки, європейська система безпеки, військове співробітництво між державами, війна в Україні.